As we commemorate the 100th anniversary of its abolishment, let's continue reflecting on the Caliphate. The absence of the Caliphate, and therefore the lack of a political center of initiative for Muslims, remains the fundamental determinant of the contemporary circumstances of Muslims. Although the Caliphate was abolished within the borders of Türkiye, its repercussions have affected Muslims worldwide.
For the first generation of Islamic thinkers in the Republic, it was a traumatic event in terms of self-awareness and perception. The state of affairs in the Muslim world after this event could aptly be described as "post-caliphate." For the first time in history, Muslims found themselves devoid of a political entity that could represent them, execute the ideals of Islam in the world, implement Islamic laws, and exhibit a political presence in the name of Islam. This situation has two essential dimensions that need to be addressed:
Firstly, from the perspective of Islamic jurisprudence, this situation had not been defined under previous conditions. Muslims have historically lived as minorities among other nations, yet they still possessed a political entity that they could identify with and position their circumstances accordingly.
Secondly, it often refers back to the situation before the abolition of the Caliphate. The Caliphate, in its pre-abolition state, had drifted far from meeting the expectations and needs of the world's Muslims and often became susceptible and defenseless to manipulations by the world system. Additionally, there were concerns that the Caliphate did not operate in accordance with Islam's principle of consultation (shura), and there were discomforts regarding its occasional use as a tool for political power calculations.
The Islamic intellectuals of the period, who later expressed great opposition to the abolition of the Caliphate, had criticisms in this regard. From Said Nursi to Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır, from Mehmed Akif to Iskilipli Atif Hoca, almost all Islamic thinkers or scholars had criticized those who occupied the caliphal office or the manner in which the caliphate was used. The content of Ali Abdurrazak's treatise, which became known in Egypt as a result of the Caliphate, seems shareable if the option of the abolition of the caliphate were not available. It is known that Abdurrazak's treatise was translated into Turkish by Omar Riza Dogrul, the son-in-law of Mehmed Akif, and published in Turkish in 1927. In this treatise, Abdurrazak emphasized that the Caliphate was a political institution rather than a religious one and concluded that its presence in the hands of Ottoman sultans did not provide religious authority to the Ottomans. He also ruled that it was permissible for Muslims to manifest their political existence through different organizations in various situations. When this work was published, it was announced in Türkiye that the Caliphate had not yet been completely abolished, and all its duties and qualities were contained within the spiritual personality of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, provided that sufficient trust was placed in the cadres of the Republic. It is possible to say that such a solution was already present in the political horizon of Islamic thinkers of the period.
Despite this, we understand from the subsequent attitudes that none of these Islamic figures had demanded the abolition of the Caliphate or were ready for such a move. The abolition of the Caliphate created a vacuum that made the application of Islamic law impossible. Since the establishment of Islamic law had not been defined in a situation where there was no Muslim leadership institution in the world since the formation period, the Qur'an addressed Muslims in a political organization. Otherwise, most of these provisions became null and void. Among these were a series of practices ranging from the continuation of daily civil affairs to more macro societal regulations. The absence of an Islamic political body left many verses of the Quran, which Muslims considered sacred, without an addressee.
On the other hand, the foundation of statism, which can be attributed to most Muslims, originated from the fact that being stateless was considered a fundamental condition for living a Muslim life. A state that would enforce Allah's punishments gave Muslims a strong sense of a body-organ relationship that they would integrate with, and whose common goals they would obey. It should be remembered that this statism attributed to Sunni political doctrine ultimately constituted the political and intellectual background of Turkish Islamism.
Therefore, this new situation resulting from the abolition of the caliphate could be symbolized by Muslims becoming bodiless organs. The old regime, the old political body, was nullified by the replacement of another societal and political body on the same organs (the mass) with a different body. The new political body being attempted to be substituted claimed authority over the human resources or institutions that vitalized the old one. One of the main reasons for insisting so much on appearance was to attribute the new political spirit to individual bodies who felt themselves belonging to the old political spirit through the new dress they had to wear.
Of course, this physical possession had a dimension related to modernism. It was considered sufficient for people to sell their bodies/organs, which they felt belonged to someone else in their minds and souls, to a new political body
through symbolism loaded on the clothes they had to wear. Initially, this situation seemed to suggest that modernism did not require a unity of action and faith. However, for individuals facing the reality of being without a caliphate, this unity of action and faith, which faced fragmentation with the abolition of the caliphate, was not considered insignificant. Especially when the dress symbolism faced (like the hat revolution) implied breathing life into alternative political bodies other than Islam, it turned the first reactions against the caliphate into a real tragedy. Considering the other religious implications of this situation, it is inconceivable that it did not create tension.
Therefore, the process of being without a caliphate generally began for many Muslims around the world, and especially for Turkish Muslims, with a serious consciousness trauma. After the initial effects of this trauma, Islamic thinkers trying to make sense of what happened did not initially accept this situation as a permanent one and as one of the possible states of Muslims. Because under these circumstances, a Muslim life left them devoid of all kinds of relations. A literature of "temporary states" was one of the most striking elements in the early Islamic texts of the post-caliphate period. However, these temporary states or the state of being without a caliph resulted in very different reactions, consequences, or quests for Islamic thinkers. Reflecting on this is crucial for understanding the current circumstances of Muslims.
NOTE: This article is an excerpt from my doctoral thesis titled "Body, Text, Identity: Islamist Discourses of Authenticity in Modern Türkiye," which I completed in the sociology department at METU in 1997.
