What is the formula to rebuild a new Iraq again, after numerous failures? Can the winning offensive of the Iraqi security forces, the Army, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and the Federal police be enough to inflate energy to a new reconciliation initiative, as planned for next September? Can sectarianism have faded to allow a political process of national unification? Can a new government gain the trust of ordinary people by eliminating the huge burden of corruption? What role could be played by the Badr organization and the anti-sectarian attitude, but having strong links with Iran, of its leader, Hadi al Amiri? Are they taking orders by Tehran or can they support a national interest? These are just a few in the long list of questions that need answers.
It has taken about fourteen months, from Spring 2015 to Summer 2016, for the Iraqi security forces to reconquer what the Black caliph, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, had seized from the state of Iraq. Now Ramadi and Fallujah are back in the Iraqi government hands. Only 14 months were needed to break the international lack of confidence in Iraq's capacity to manage its own security, to control its territory, to fulfill its commitments to the Iraqi people and to international partners. The huge amount of money that has been poured in to train the security forces who, in the Summer of 2014, had melted like snow under the sun in front of the so-called Islamic State's offensive, had cast a bias in international media as well as in foreign chancelleries.
The stigma of 'corrupted government' labeled any news from Iraq, even when the Iraqi answer to this issue was being delivered. The call of Shia religious leader al Sistani to establish a Popular Mobilization Force worked. However, another strong bias took over: the Shia "militia" is simply the long hand of Iran. The call worked to save Iraq from the consequence of the Iraqi army disbanding in front of the Islamic State offensive. It worked to create a military force based on a popular call, without great need for financial resources. Flip-flop sandals and a Kalashnikov could be its trade mark.
Brave and humble fighters could be another label. Even so, the international media (and the general international political leadership) were extremely "cold" about the possibility to rebuilding confidence in Iraq's future, despite the fact that Samarra, Tikrit and Baji cities had been retaken last year. There was a litmus test of those problems: the resignation of Marine Corp General Robert Allen, the White House special envoy for the war against Daesh and former ISAF commander, in the Summer of 2015. "Micromanagement" was a simple word that the former ISAF commander used in his resignation letter that could explain the complexity of the Iraqi scenario. The General's mood was influenced by mistrust and a sense of uselessness and insufficient efforts. Especially on the U.S. side, a strategic partner for Baghdad, where the Obama administration had to manage an unpleasant situation: handle an exit strategy from the Middle East and North Africa, leaving a security framework that would not allow any bold actions by regional and international actors, while the political power of last year's presidential mandate was decreasing progressively, leaving room to all kinds of interests to influence the fragile situation in Iraq. Nearly a “mission impossible.”
On June 22nd 2016, Fallujah was declared liberated from the heinous grab of Daesh. Now it is time to think about a reconciliation process. Yet another one for this martyrized country, which is Iraq. Once again, the PMF and Shia organizations like Badr have played a key role. Why? Because popular units were legitimated in front of the Iraqi people. Recruitment was not a matter of money. They received the full support of the people. There were even Christian and Yazidhe Kataib (Yazidi brigade) supporting the PMF and Badr. However, the sectarian issue was more stressed by the media due to previous violence episodes, than by facts on the ground. During the retake of Fallujah (Operation Breaking Terrorism), al Sistani called again. The religious leader released instructions regarding respecting moral principles, while advancing in the Sunni city.
On May 23rd, 2016, Karmah, a town laying just 16 kilometers north-east of Fallujah, was seized by the PMF and likely by elements of the Iranian Quds force unit. Hence, the support of the IRG (Iranian Revolutionary Guards) special force in Iraq is actually real; it is a fact, as well as the presence of other Western special operations forces. But it is not a negative factor for the future of Iraq. Tehran was awarded by Washington's temporary confidence as rational regional player.
After years of unpleasant tests of Riyadh, political behaviors that were often in contrast of U.S. interests in the region were: stabilizing the region as soon as possible, in order to leave the scene and to focus better on Asia. Saudi Arabia is no longer a state; it is a complex framework of powers and interests that endanger its unity and policy. Branches of the royal family and several Wahhabi foundations work on their own interests, with their own foreign policy. That is fueling more instability in an already unstable region.
Now a new reconciliation process is going to take place in September, but some points need to be stressed. There is once more a mainstream narrative linked to defined interests that want this process to fail. Such interests do not like Washington's new opening policy towards Tehran. They will stress the sectarian problem - that is an actual one - in any possible way, along with the fragility of the nation's framework, the mistrust toward a main actor in the process, Iran, the will to split Iraq's territorial integrity to play this card even on Syria's table. On the other hand, there is the Iraqi main stream situation, the will of the people to live an ordinary life without heinous daily violence. Among them, thousands of PMF volunteers had joined the force because they really want to live in peace in Iraq. For ordinary people, the main problem is the weak legitimacy of the government due to the high corruption rate, not a makeshift plan assembled in some Western think tank. That is the main problem for people that have to deal with intermittent electricity several times a day, as well as for phone lines. Living in a city where real estate, in some districts, is more expensive than downtown Rome, is not easy and is a symptom of the level of corruption. Kharrada - a district just outside the Green zone, on the East bank of Tigris river, which hosts Christian sectors and is full of life and street activities - was badly hit by a bombing attack at the end of July. It was the deadliest attack ever in Iraq.
Unfortunately, the reconciliation plans often took into account the international political balance more than local interests. Now, Hashd al Shaabi units are keeping up in integration with the national Army and an organization like Badr brigade, which played a crucial role defeating Daesh, and should play a positive role in the reconciliation path as well. So what next? Badr seems to be the strongest unit among the PMF. Of note, its leader Hadi al Amiri, maintains a non-sectarian attitude, despite the fact that he fought the long war Iraq-Iran on the Iranian side, and that he recently stated that the commander of Quds Force (the special branch of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard) is “like a brother” to him. Still, he received the confidence of the Iraqi people, also thanks to his pragmatic approach to politics:
"First we have to defeat Daesh, then we can reform the political system in Iraq." We don't know what he means for "reforms," but surely he is playing a key role in this new reconciliation process. All Iraqi and international actors along with the U.N. and U.S. diplomacies, the Sunni sheiks of Anbar and Shia clerics and political leaders from Kerbal and Najaf, just to quote some among numerous actors in this process, will try to achieve some aims in the conference. The most important problem is finding a way to mend Shia-Sunni relations. Find the rights actors for reconciliation is a strategic point because in the war against Daesh the deal with Sunni tribes was a game changer. Even deliver data about Reconciliation office work since 2007 until 2016 can help. It could help to understand mistakes and accomplishments. But the list of key points is longer and we can only stress some of them.
History teaches us that some past conflicts have been resolved by different means. India's 1947 partition needed a constitutional protection of minority rights. The Lebanese civil war required a redistribution of wealth. Civil conflicts in Guatemala (1960-1996), in Algeria (1991-1998) and in Malay (1948-1960) ended thanks to a kind of amnesty to involved parties. Maybe Iraq needs all of these means. History tells us even another thing. During the XI century, Nizamal Mulk, a Farsi vizier of Selgiuchid, Arp Arslan then of his son Malik shah, tried a unification process with the Sunni khalifa, the Farsi good administration and a Turkish sultan. It worked for a while, maybe it could be a trace for a new road map. The reshaping of the Great Middle East is on stage now and the new Iraq has to play a strategic role.
By Pierre Chiartano
